The legacy of the hyphen:
Jewish-German-Universal Culture,
Multiculturalism, and the nation-state of Israel

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Throughout the nineteenth-century, and at the beginning of the twentieth, a unique cultural phenomenon arose; a phenomenon that I refer to as 'The Jewish-German-Universal hyphen-culture'. This culture embodied the encounter between two contradictory tendencies among the Jews in Germany. On the one hand, as a result of the emancipation, Jews wished to be fully assimilated into German national society and to embrace the universal ideas of the enlightenment. On the other hand, many Jews kept themselves within an exclusively Jewish milieu and were trying to redefine 'the essence of Judaism'. This conflict prompted the emergence of a hyphenated identity that encompassed an unresolved tension between Jewish particularity on one side of the hyphen and Universal ideas on the other side.

In what way do the main ideas of the Jewish-German-Universal hyphen-culture relate to Jewish nationalism as it is manifested in the contemporary state of Israel? **In principle,** one should answer this question by analyzing the idea of a nation-state which stands in diametric opposition to the ideas of the hyphen-culture. The nation state finds it hard to contain the deep ambiguity that resides in combining both sides of the hyphen, and it therefore sees the hyphen as a threat. The ideology of nationalism tries to render all hyphens redundant in its drive to forge a homogeneous society in its 'melting pot'. **In practice**, one would answer this question by acknowledging that the Israeli society is a profoundly hyphenated culture - first because it combines two nations that are in a long bloody conflict, and second because, even within Jewish-Israeli society there are always tensions between the sub-cultures (Jewish-Russians, Jewish-Moroccans, etc), and the dominant Israeli identity, that is itself already a hyphenated Jewish-Israeli identity. The fact that this culture is so hyphenated from the start, can explain why the nation-state of Israel sets so much store by the idea of 'the melting pot', attempting to render redundant all hyphens. Paradoxically we can say that hyphenated identity is an even greater threat for the nation-state in a society that is profoundly hyphenated in the first place.

In this paper I will delineate the main ideas that shaped the Jewish-German-Universal Hyphen-culture. I will show the opposition of 'the hyphen' to the idea of a nation-state and examine the difference between this opposition and the Multicultural challenge to the national melting pot. Eventually the question will be raised whether the idea of the hyphen can contribute to the identity of a society that strives to get rid of all hyphens but is hyphenated de facto in the first place.

1. Particularity and Assimilation

Two major tendencies that paradoxically contradict one another but also complement each other, can characterize Jewish-German thinking in the 19th century and the first third of the 20th century - Particularity and Assimilation. Many examples can be brought to show these tendencies but I will suffice with a few. The tendency to emphasize Jewish particularity was clearly seen in the social milieu of Jewish intellectuals. As apposed to their declared wish to be fully absorbed into the German society, most intellectuals were socially involved with 'people like us', that is, Jews who want to be full Germans, but not with Germans who are not Jewish or more traditional Jews from the east. Gershom Scholem for example noticed that his parents hosted in their house only Jews and also went to visit only Jews. He says that his friends that grew up in that time, report similar happenings[1]. Scholem's parents saw themselves as full Germans and their attitude towards Jewish heritage was distant[2], but they nevertheless stayed in an exclusively Jewish milieu. Insisting on Jewish particularity and remaining isolated form the society around them, is of course not a new phenomenon in Jewish history, but in the period with which we are dealing a new extensive effort was made to redefine Jewish uniqueness and to express this difference in terms appropriate to modernity. Leo Baeck's Book on 'the essence of Judaism'[3] is one example of the effort to articulate this essence, an effort that was made by many thinkers before Baeck and after him. Jewish thinkers tried to redefine the particularity of Jewish culture in terms of modern society and in order to do so they usually used the one concept with which Europeans defined their identity in the turn of the century – Nationalism, a point that I will get back too later.

Examples for the tendency to assimilate are many since assimilation and emancipation are two terms that were combined in the history of modern Jews from their very beginning. At first look it seems that the tendency to assimilate contradicts the Jewish particularism that we just articulated, but as we shall see, **particularism was combined with its negation as a needed step in the process of assimilation.** One of the main concepts that influenced the Jewish self-perception in the 19th century was *Bildung* – the idea of self cultivation and education. This cultural and philosophical 'movement' focused on an ideal individual: enlightened, humanist and free; a man of the world, whose culture is not rooted in any specific religion or nation, he is *the* European par-excellence[4]. Because of *Bildung's* emphasis on the individual, many of the Jews in Germany perceived it as an ideal tool for full assimilation[5]. According to *Bildung* it doesn't matter where one comes from, it only matters where one is headed and, therefore, it is no wonder many Jews adopted *Bildung* enthusiastically. The overall acceptance of *Bildung* in the minds of German-Jewish intellectuals changed the content of both Judaism and Germanism for them. The term *Bildung* became part of their Jewishness[6]; cultural artifacts that in the past were considered German and foreign, were now perceived as the very essence of their culture[7]. One example for that is given by George L. Mosse in his book 'German Jews Beyond Judaism'. He says that during the Nazi regime, when Jews were not allowed to perform the great works of the German culture: Mozart, Beethoven, Göthe and others, Jews felt that an important part of their identity had been stolen from them[8]. But not only their German identity was stolen, we could also say that The Nazis stole their Jewishness because being Jewish in Germany of the 19th and 20th century meant, among other things, admiring Göthe and Mozart. Michael Brenner states that although many of the Jews in the turn of the century were proud of the renaissance of Jewish culture in Germany, this emergence of Jewish culture had little to do with traditional Judaism[9]. Moritz Goldstein, one of the young and challenging writers in the turn of the century phrased this very well when he wrote in 1912: 'German cultural life seems to pass increasingly into Jewish hands […] we Jews are administering the spiritual property of a nation which denies our right and our ability to do so'[10]. Not only the writers of German culture were Jews, also its readers. Goldstein noticed that the circle of readers for German classic was gradually decreasing and it became clear that the moral and universal values that characterized what the Jews called 'European culture' was written by Jews and read by other Jews[11]. Mosse says that although theoretically *Bildung* was supposed to be the perfect tool for Jewish assimilation into German society, what actually happened at the turn of the century was that while the Jews were

seeking a new religion in the universal ideas of *Bildung*, the Germans were finding a new religion in Nationalism[12]. The nationalist critics found *Bildung* to be too Jewish, so instead of being a tool for assimilation it became a leading factor in the separation of Jews from their surroundings. We can see *Bildung* then, as a good example of how the two contradicting tendencies were entwined.

The combination of the two tendencies, in the idea of the *bildung*, and in many other cultural phenomena's which I will not discuss here, led many Jewish thinkers to insist on Jewish cultural particularity with a content that was actually identical to the philosophical ideas that guided their thought in general, in other words these thinkers identified Judaism with philosophy in general, and with German idealism in particular. Many Jewish thinkers found within Judaism justification for their philosophical claims. Amos Funkenstein describes this as follows:

> 'Between Mendelson's *Jerusalem* and Rosenzweig's *Sten der Erlösung*, German-Jewish philosophies of religion translated "the essence of Judaism" – this ghost of an evanescent quantity – into the one or the other current philosophical or historic idioms. At times they argued the assumption of Judaism under pure ethics – and be it as its noblest concretization. At times they spoke the language of objective idealism. Sometimes they even argued, a la Schleiermacher, the irreducibility of religious sentiment or, with Schelling, the Facticity of revelation. Yet in all of their varieties, they endeavored to distill "the essence of Judaism" and show its accord with the culture they wished to be embraced by. The sole exceptions were Mendelson and Rosenzeig […]'[13].

Funkenstein was concerned with the exceptions, Mendelson and Rosenzweig, but for our discussion the rule is more important – Jewish-German thinkers recognized the essence of Judaism in universal values and in the philosophical ideas that they favored. Anarchists like Bernard Lazare, Martin Buber and Gustav Landauer found in it claims against the authority of the state[14], ethicists like Moriz Lazarus, Leo Baeck and of course Hermann Cohen, found in Jewish 'ethical-monotheism' a basis for an ethical religion of reason. They all portrayed Judaism as a universal ethic which is unrelated to any specific people. This tendency to see Judaism as a set of universal ideas was a significant factor in the effort of Jewish intellectuals to imagine themselves as an inherent component of European culture.

The two tendencies described above contradict one another of course, because one who emphasizes his particularity should not be surprised if people around him reject his wish to assimilate, but why do the two also compliment each other? Why did Jews put so much store in a new definition of the essence of Judaism in a time when they were demanded, from within and from without, to assimilate into German society and to give up much of their cultural particularity? Two reasons can be suggested: **First**, since the turn of the century was a time of national flourishing in Europe and the European political discourse was full of nationalist ideas, Jews defined their identity using nationalist terms and therefore even some of the opponents to Zionism, began to talk about Judaism as a kind of nationality[15]. In the European concepts of that time, the general belief was that the only way to accomplish a union of all humanity is through the formation of a family of nations. This is why Jews thought that they can be part of Western humanity only by redefining Judaism as a nation and toward this goal it was necessary to determine what is particular in Jewish existence. In other words, defining Jewish national particularity was perceived as a necessary step on the path to Jewish assimilation into the family of nations of the West. This sort of assimilation, which was accepted by most Zionist currents, was open to the Jews as a collective, not for the individual. **Second**, in terms of the individual Jew, it seemed that the demand for Jews to assimilate threatened many Jews who wanted to be part of the new German state, but also didn't want to completely lose their identity as Jews. Redefining the essence of Judaism in modern terms was perceived by these Jews as a kind of insurance against the full loss of Jewish identity after civilizing into the new German nation-state. Individual Jews insisted on finding a new meaning to their particularity in order to be fully absorbed into the German culture. We can see then how the two tendencies that contradict one another also compliment each other - the aspiration

to redefine Jewish particularity was perceived as a necessary step in the way of assimilation, both for the collective and for the individual Jew.

The combination of particularity and assimilation was a significant force in the shaping of what is sometimes referred to nowadays, in post-colonial studies[16], as 'Hyphen-identity' or 'Hyphen culture'[17]. I believe this term can aptly describe the unique cultural phenomena of German-Jews at the beginning of the 20th century. A hyphen-culture is a culture in which both sides of the hyphen define the identity of a person in an equal manner. An Afro-American for example, is certainly not African, he usually doesn't know much about African culture, but he is also often not seen as a real American, not by himself and not by others. Similarly, In a Jewish-German hyphen-culture, people feel that, neither their Jewishness, nor their Germaness is more central or more primary in their identity, and that the sides of the hyphen are inseparable – their Jewishness **is** their Germaness. German-Jews found very little content, if at all, in their Jewish identity outside of the German context. Many of them were detached from religious elements that might have connected them to other Jews in Europe and outside of it. Moritz Goldstein states this inherent connection of the two sides of the hyphen in his well known article, 'Deutsch-Jüdischer Parnaß'. He says that even if the Jews were to leave the German culture as they are expected to do by some of their German colleges, they could not do so because they are rooted in German soil and tradition[18], in some cases for an even longer time than others who call themselves Germans.

2.   Jewish-German-**Universal**

In order to understand Jewish-German hyphen-culture it is important to note that when Jewish thinkers talked about German identity in the 19th century they usually referred to universal values. German culture was perceived by Germans in general and by German-Jews in particular, as the universal culture of Europe and as the successor of the Greek culture. Germanism in the time of the Enlightenment and before the rise of nationalism was seen as universal humanism. Hermann Cohen states this very clearly when he writes that: 'the German spirit is the spirit of classical humanism and of real citizenship'[19], and Goldstein wrote:

> 'We too are the disciples of Greeks and the Romans. We too had shaped our Ideals in the light of Schiller, thought about Faust and joined "Green Heinrich[20]" in our youth. And if we had ambition – and indeed we had – which figures stood in front of our eyes? Göthe and Lessing, Kant and Beethoven'[21].

At the turn of the century Jewish intellectuals talked about their German identity using universal terms. It is therefore worthwhile to add another hyphen to the Jewish-German Culture and to see it as a Jewish-German-Universal culture. By this triple hyphen-culture I mean that for the Jews in Germany, being Jewish involved a universal world-view that was perceived as part of their identity as German thinkers. The great minds of Germany, Kant, Göthe, Hegel and many others, precisely because they were Germans, were perceived as 'prophets' for all humanity. Goldstein also says that Jewish morality and justice stand at the center of the European world view and that Judaism should be seen as the source of what Europe is. Jews in his mind can be called 'Pre-Europeans' or even 'Hyper-Europeans'[22].

Seeing Universality as the essence of the German Culture should be accepted with suspicion because it can be easily connected to the racial ideas about the German nation that took hold of German nationalism a short time after this. Only a thin line separates the claim that the German spirit is a universal one, and the claim that this spirit is superior to any other spirit and therefore should rule humanity as a whole. However this bothersome similarity is not sufficient to slander the universalist claims of all Germans with a stain of racism. Furthermore, seeing universal values as the essence of Judaism also entails a contradiction, for if 'Jewish values' are universal, why do Jews, of all people, keep and fulfill them? And if only Jews fulfill them, in what way can they be seen as universal? This problem is reflected, for example in an essay that Ludwig Holländer, one of the leaders of liberal Jews in Germany[23], wrote in 1932 under the title: 'Why are we, and why would we stay Jewish?':

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'We find in Judaism the fulfillment of the great basic demands of our lives, the ideal of personality, the ideal of religion, the ideal of the family, of social ethics, of the will, education and peace … in its long history of suffering and tears, Judaism has always defended its ideals against the whole world'[24].

Holländer portrays Judaism as the embodiment of universal values that stand at the forefront of European culture in general and German culture in particular. Judaism is for him the precise values that should be held by all enlightened people and should not distinguish between Jew and German. However these human values turn in his own words into particular Jewish values that differentiate the Jews from the rest of the world and stand at the center of the Jewish struggle against the world. In other words, Holländer and many other Jews of his time thought that Jews should fight for universality against the whole universe, because this 'universe' in their time was nationalist.

What happens at the meeting point of the universal Ideas of the German-Jewish hyphen-culture and the Nation-State? The sons and daughters of the Jewish-German hyphen-culture encountered two national phenomena that threatened the tight binding of their hyphens, first in the German nation-state and than in Zionism and in its realization in the nation-state of Israel. I will now consider the theoretical opposition of the nation-state and the hyphen culture, concentrating on this clash in the state of Israel.

3.　　　　Nationalism makes all hyphens redundant

Among theoreticians of Nationalism there is a well known disagreement about the primordiality of nationalism. On the one side of this debate stand several national practices (Myths and stories, ceremonies, memorials, texts, etc.) that portray nationalism as an ancient idea and as a realization of the yearning of a large group of people for self definition. Supporting these practices, there are a few theoreticians that study the historical foundations on which the national way of thinking is based. Anthony D. Smith for example says that nationalism is a natural historical outcome of primordial tribal identity[25]. As apposed to these practices and theories, theoreticians like Benedict Anderson, Ernst Gelner and Eric Hobssbaum[26] claim that nationalism is a modern phenomenon - a relatively new political apparatus for recruiting social powers into the hands of certain social elites[27]. It is important to note that even Smith agrees with the assertion that nationalism is modern, but he wishes to examine the pre-modern roots of this new conscience of unity: 'While we can no longer regard the nation as a given social existence, a 'premordial' and natural unit of human association outside time, neither can we accept that it is a wholly modern phenomenon'[28]. His later studies from the mid 80's were written as a response for the works of Anderson, Gelner and Hobssbaum.

Benedict Anderson discussed three 'paradoxes'[29] in nationalism: 1) its objective modernity as apposed to the desire of its followers to portray it as old. 2) the assumption that nationalism is both a universal and a particular idea, that is, on the one hand nationalism is the principle that divides and separates the people of one nation from the people of another, but on the other hand it is supposed to be a universal principle – everybody has to be part of a nation and no one can define his own identity unless he is part of a nation. 3) The political power of nationalism as opposed to its theoretical weakness. Anderson thinks that Nationalism is a powerful movement that didn't raise any significant theory to support itself. It seems to me that an even more profound 'paradox' than these three is the virtuality of the national idea, being a political principle that almost every state desires to obtain, but very few states do so in reality. Nationalism succeeded in situating itself as the main political principle of the 20th century. There is hardly any state in the world that does not try to portray its identity, in one way or another, as a classic nation-state; that is, as a realization of the principle 'one state for one nation'. Even immigration-states, like Canada, Australia and the United States, that cannot claim they inhabit a primordial ancient nation with a lifespan of more that 200 years, even these states make great efforts in shaping national symbols and characteristics. However in

spite of this, there are very few states that can rightfully claim that they fulfill this principle. Azmi Bishara states this as follows: 'Only percent[30] of the states in the world are "real" nation-states, that is, states in which the loyalty to the nation is completely parallel to the loyalty to the state. The rest of the states in the world are populated by more than one nation, but we, nevertheless, keep calling them all 'Nation-States'[31]. Will Kymlicka says that, according to several estimations, of the 184 independent states in the world (in 1995) there are more than 600 language groups and more than 5000 ethnic groups[32]. It is, therefore, the case that the national idea that many states define themselves by, is actually a virtual idea that is not realized in the majority if these states. Kymlicka uses the term 'Multi-National State' to refer to any state with more than one nation[33]. If we wish to be even more meticulous with this definition we should note that even in the few states that he would call 'real' nation states, live people from other nations - work immigrants, marriage immigrants and so on - that don't comprise a real identified minority but are nonetheless alien to the hegemonic nation and so even in these states there can never be full congruence between Nation and state. This statistic proof for the non-national reality that we live in doesn't stop nationalism from being one of the most significant factors in the shaping of modern identity. Nationalism is a virtual idea, but aspiration to this idea has a strong influence on present reality.

Nationalism, as its theoreticians stress, is a political framework that expresses itself in a given modern context[34]. The modernity of the nation creates a significant need for any nation-state to invent or to imagine itself and to spread the word of this imagination in every possible way. Invention[35] and imagination[36] are crucial tools for recruiting the citizens of a state for common enterprise and for the realization of national sovereignty. The most significant tool for imagining a society as national was, at least in the 19th century, the science of history. The national propaganda told the story of the nation as if there is a long and extensive past that stands behind it. These national narratives were acting on Nationalism's weakest point. Wherever there was no common past, a common past was invented, and in this way new nations told their story as if there is a long and heroic past that was forgotten over that years and needs to be revived. Anderson showed that at least in the European cases, nationalities imagined themselves as 'awakening from sleep'[37], as if the national element was always hidden in the local tradition and only now, in modernity, it comes awake again. Zionism, with its emphasis on returning to the time of the Bible and the heroic stories of Bar-Cochva and Jehuda the Macabee, is a good example of a nation that imagines itself as waking up after long years of slumber in the Diaspora.

In order to tell its own story to itself, to its people and to nations around it, the nation needs wide-ranging pedagogic mechanisms that help forgetting and remembering certain events. Anderson brings for an example the considerable propaganda that helped the Americans remember the battles in 1861 – 1865 as a war between brothers. He claims that if the South would have won that war, it would have been presented otherwise[38]. It may well be that if the South would have won, the war would have been presented as a national struggle of the southern states against the attempt of the North to portray the whole land as theirs. Eric Hobsbaum says that in the 40 years before the Second World War, there were great efforts to invent national traditions[39]. He uses the examples of ceremonies (Bastille Day commemorations, for example), statues and buildings, holidays (Thanksgiving in the United States), stamps and so on. We can see then that the project of inventing a nation is based on a large cultural creative effort. Nations have to emphasize to themselves and to their surroundings what is unique to their nation and in what are they different from other nations. They have to set national dishes and costumes, national customs and holidays, sacred geographical sites and constitutive historical events. In short, we can say that nations had to invent peoples, or as one Italian thinker of the 19th century put it, 'we have made Italy, now we must make Italians'[40].

All this wide process of invention, imagination and propaganda is sometimes called **the national melting pot**. Seeing nationalism as modern[41], invented[42], imagined[43] or virtual[44], stresses the need of political groups to melt cultural diversity into unified forms. The melting pot is a process of objectification – it takes subjects that are complex and diverse, and portrays

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them in unified colors that are not theirs. The attempt of the nation state to melt into one pot different cultures stands, of course, in opposition to the ideas of the hyphen-culture that I discussed in the first part of this paper. The melting pot is evidence of the need of the nation-state to give up all hyphens and create a unified culture[45]. A nation-state (Israel for example) finds it hard to cope with the fact that within its territory there are not just 'Israelis', but 'Jewish-Israelis' and 'Arab-Israelis', 'Jewish-Ethiopian-Israelis' and 'Jewish-Moroccan-Israelis'. Citizens that are not just Israelis but Arab-Israelis, might be a threat to national security, Jewish-Ethiopian-Israelis might be in conflict and struggle against Jewish-Moroccan-Israelis and therefore harm the unity of the nation. This is even worse in states that are in a situation of war against other nation-states. In this case the need to make all hyphens redundant is even more serious and the state tends to use more pedagogic apparatuses to recruit all the civilians for the needed causes of the nation. Yossi Dahan and Henry Wassermann claim this in the case of Israel:

> 'The Jewish citizens of Israel didn't need the theories of the primordialists (like Smith, A.D) in order to establish the authentic Jewish primordialism, which they inherited from their mothers milk and which they were nourished upon all their lives. This approach has a major significance for the Zionistic project in general and for the state of Israel in particular, which, to be honest, can not be justified without a big loud declaration of Jewish primordialism'[46].

An interesting example of the attempt to make redundant the hyphens of a sub-group within the nation can be found in another hyphen-identity that I will not discuss in detail – the Arab-Jews. The dichotomy between Arabs and Jews in contemporary Israel does not allow Jews who have an Arabic culture to define themselves as Arab-Jews. Jehuda Shenhav[47] who has took upon himself to return the term 'Arab-Jews' into identity-discourse in Israel says that in *Israel/Palestine*, After 100 years of violent conflict, the meaning of 'being Jewish' becomes more and more identified with, 'not being Arabic'. If you are aware of the many utterances in the media of the Jewish-Arabic conflict you can not but absorb the absolute dichotomy of the two identities. Shenhav states that the national logic and the colonial one were entangled in the Zionist case and therefore 'in order to include the Arab-Jews in the national project they had to go through a process of de-Arabization, purification of the Arab-Jew out of his Arabness'[48]. His use of the term Arab-Jew is determined to make available for discourse a term that used to be possible in the past but in the present sounds paradoxical[49]. From Shenhav's ideas we can learn that the possibility to re-use an identity definition that existed in the past but does not exist in the present is a way of subverting the present and in this way also reshaping it.

Following Shenhav's words on the de-Arabization of the Arab-Jews, we should ask what happened to the bearers of the Jewish-German-Universal Hyphen-culture in their encounter with Zionism. Did they go through a process of de-Germanization and de-Universalization in order to become real Israelis? A good example for this de-Universalization I heard from my mother's encounter with the Kibbutz. She testifies that when she came to the Kibbutz in the early fifties the members' council decided that the members would not read books that are not in Hebrew, and therefore books that she brought in German, Spanish and English were turned (because of the economic stress – the *Tzena*) into toilet paper[50]. The German high literature that was a significant part of the identity of the German-Jews, as pupils of the *Builung*, was perceived in the context of the Zionist project to be foreign and therefore German-Jews had to take upon themselves the identity of the pioneer, *Halutz*, which meant (how ironical) Russian songs translated to Hebrew.

As I stated before, in the Jewish-German-Universal Hyphen-culture there wasn't much meaning for Jewish identity outside of the German context and we should therefore say that when the bearers of the hyphen culture had to give up their hyphens under the national identity, not only their German and Universal identity was hurt, but also their Jewish identity. We can assume than that the process of getting rid of the hyphens for nationalism, a process that was done willingly by most of the German-Jews, was also a process of de-Judaization that was needed in order to make the German-Jews into Israelis.

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4. Multi-Culturalism and the Hyphen

So far we have seen the principle ideas of the hyphen culture as opposed to the national idea of the melting pot. However it is important to differentiate between the idea that usually stands against the idea of the melting pot – multiculturalism, and the hyphen culture. The diverse discourse on multiculturalism is centered on the relations of a dominant culture and its surroundings. In this discourse it is presumed that the dominant culture is more or less identifiable and that the cultures around it are also mostly well defined. The term 'Hyphen-Culture' on the contrary, presumes that cultural diversity takes place, not only between one group and another, not only between center and periphery, between hegemony and the subaltered. Hyphenated identity is a sign for cultural diversity inside the hegemonic culture itself. There is no doubt that many of the German-Jews found a central place in the new national-state of Israel and that most of them took upon themselves the national Idea willingly, but in spite of this, I think it is important to clarify the cultural loss that was inflicted in the process of altering their hyphen-culture into Jewish nationalism.

The multicultural discourse is in many ways a struggle-discourse of marginal groups which claim their rights against the hegemonic culture. These marginal groups can be national, gender, economic, or racial 'minorities' that suffer from political disadvantage. One example for this can be found in Gloria Anzalda. Anzalda's portrait of the 'Mestiza' can clarify the difference between the opposition embodied in the hyphen-culture, and the critique of nationalism proposed by multi-culturalism. The 'Mestiza' are women that live between three cultures: American, Spanish-Mexican, and Indian-Mexican. Anzalda's book, 'Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza' is comprised of a concoction, a deliberately unclear one, of English, Spanish and Indian names and myths. Anzalda hyphenates or slashes many words, as can be seen in her title, because she wants to portray the slashed identity of the Mestiza as a subversive element and as a feminist-postcolonial critique of the hegemonic culture - against Mexican nationalism on the one hand, and against American nationalism on the other. The Mestiza, an Aztec word that means 'torn between ways' learns to juggle identities and this is why Anzalda sees herself as part of more than one culture:

> 'The new *mestiza* copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican from an Anglo point of view. She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode – nothing is thrust out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else'[51].

There is a share of romantic spirit in this portrait, as if the life of the Mestiza on the borderlands is open and pluralistic because she knows how to take the good out of the three cultures she stands between. This tone is of course absent from other parts of Anzalda's book in which one can see the great difficulty of life in the borderlands/*la frontera*. Anzalda's book aims at challenging the three cultures that she stands between. The choice of writing in a mixture of English and Spanish enables only readers native in the two languages to fully understand her nuances and therefore forces the hegemonic culture to make a double effort in order to understand the book.

Multiculturalism is a discourse based on struggle. It is aimed at preventing the subversion of minorities that stand against a dominant culture. Hyphenated discourse, on the other hand, must subvert even deeper under the presumptions of the national culture and it therefore should be seen as an even more radical alternative to the national melting pot than multiculturalism. From this perspective, seeing culture as hyphenated should be treated as a radical branch of multicultural and postcolonial thought. In postcolonial thought much ado is made of the subjugation of the marginalized. In the Jewish-German-Universal hyphen-culture's encounter with the national state of Israel there was very little, if any, subjugation and maybe this is why this concept has not yet been studied in the field of the politics of identity.

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When a national culture eliminates a hyphen-culture and tries to unite it with other hyphenated cultures, there is almost no need for cultural repression by a hegemonic culture of a weaker culture, as it happens in the meetings of first and third world, usually studied by multiculturalism. The nation state eliminates, in this case, mainly the universal sensitivity that resides in the hyphen and might threaten the nation-state. The loss in liquidating a hyphen-culture is not the loss of a specific culture and does not entail the subjection and humiliation of specific individuals. On the contrary, many of the bearers of the Jewish-German hyphen-culture subjected themselves willingly to the nation state, but still a cultural loss has happened. The loss of a culture which at its base stood universal values.

5.   Conclusion

What is the relevance of hyphenated ideas for Jewish identity in general and Jewish-Israeli identity in particular? The Jewish-German-Universal hyphen-culture didn't constitute at any time a meaningful opposition, not against German nationalism before the war and not against the Jewish nation-state today. The cultural sub-ordination and the reshaping of universal ideas was done at the free will of the German-Jews that joined the Zionist project, and even gained from it quite a bit, at least in comparison with other groups in Israel today. As opposed to many of the spokesmen of multiculturalism that portray their own culture as attacked and as losing against the hegemony, the German-Jews never put themselves as a group against nationalism. Maybe it was the image of the German culture as enlightened and modern and as a representative of the West, that enabled them to see themselves as a central and needed part of Zionism. It may have been that universality, the essence of this hyphenated identity, was, paradoxically, what enabled these Jews to give up all hyphens, even universality itself, and subordinate themselves to the particularism of Zionism. Of course we should emphasize that some of the opponents to Zionism, like Hermann Cohen, Hannah Arendt and George Steiner, centered their claims against Zionism on the universality of German-Jewish identity. Their opposition was mainly motivated by the universal character that they saw in Judaism and their fear that the Jews will become fundamentalist nationalists who will betray the universal claims of Judaism. Nevertheless most of the thinkers that grew up within the hyphen-culture chose eventually to give up their universal ideas and to join the Zionist project, giving up at least some of the ideas of the hyphen.

The encounter of German-Jews with the Zionist reality in the state of Israel brought many of them to moderate the universal ideas on which they were raised. George L. Mosse claims that leaders like Martin Buber, Robert Welsch and Gustav Landauer saw particular Zionism as a needed step in the way to their Universal utopias[52] and this is exactly why their Zionism was doubtful and differed from other thinkers of their time. The thinkers of *Brith Shalom* are a good example for this complex attitude towards the Zionist idea. When Mosse portrays Gershom Scholem's ideas about this, he uses the term 'A Zionist against his time'[53] and it seems to me that this term can sum up the impossible combination of the hyphenated ideas and national ideas within the thought of some of these thinkers. They were indeed Zionists against their time, and the time was Zionist, so they were also aware of many of the problems caused by Zionist particularism. Nevertheless most of these thinkers became faithful Zionists, and contributed to the national melting pot.

In a way similar to the use of the term 'Arab-Jews' as an opposition to and subversion of some tendencies in the present, I would like to suggest the idea of the German-Jewish-Universal hyphen-culture as a way to subvert the particularism of the State of Israel today. A study of their hyphenated thinking can contribute to a universalistic discourse that seems lacking today in a de-facto highly hyphenated society that portray itself as a Jewish nation-state. I tried in this paper to suggest a few introductory remarks on the way towards a wide theory of hyphenated objection to the cultural and political loss that is embedded in the melting pot of the nation-state. This hyphenated opposition comes, not from the standpoint of the underdog, as in multicultural thought, but from well within the hegemonic culture.

Notes:

*   I would like to thank Elie Dinur for his helpful comments and corrections.

1   Gershom Scholem, 'On the Social Psychology of the Jews in Germany: 1900 – 1933', in: David Bronsen (ed.), Jews and Germans from 1860 to 1933: The Problematic Symbiosis, Heidelberg, 1979, 19. Hereafter cited as Scholem.

2   Scholem says that his father used to 'light his cigar on the Sabbath candle, uttering a mock blessing "baurei pri tobakko" ("Who created the fruit of tobacco")'. Scholem, 18.

3   Leo Baeck, The Essence of Judaism, New-York, 1948. Original edition: Das Wesen des Judentums, Berlin, 1905.

4   W. H. Bruford, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: 'Bildung' from Humboldt to Thomas Mann, London, 1975, especially see the introduction.

5   Rachel Livneh-Freudenthal, 'The Science of Judaism – First Paradigms and Paterns', in: Michael Mach & Yoram Jacobson, Historiosophy and The Science of Judaism, Tel Aviv, 2005, (Hebrew), 206. Hereafter cited as Livneh-Freudenthal.

6   George L. Mosse, German Jews Beyond Judaism, Bloomington-Indiana,1985, 4. Hereafter cited as: Mosse, German Jews.

7   Mosse, German Jews, 77.

8   Mosse, German Jews, 80.

9   Michael Brenner, The Renaissance of Jewish Culture in Weimar Germany, New Haven, Conn. 1996, 21.

10   Moritz Goldstein, 'Deutsch-Jüdischer Parnass', Der Kunstwart 25 (March 1912), 281 – 294. Hereafter cited as Goldstein Parnass. Re-quoted by Goldstein in: 'German Jewry's Dilemma: The Story of a Provocative Essay', Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 2 (1957), 237.Translated into Hebrew in: Haim Zeligman & Yaakov Goren (ed.), Streams in European Thought at the Beginning of the 20th Century and their Influence on Jews and the Zionist Movement, Ramat Efal, 2007, p. 153. On the debate following the article see: Steven E. Aschheim, '1912: The Publication of Moritz Goldstein's 'The Germen-Jewish Parnassus' Sparks a Debate over Assimilation, German Culture, and the 'Jewish Spirit'', in: Sander L. Gilman & Jack Zipes (ed.), Yale Companion to Jewish Writing and Thought in German Culture, 1096-1996, New Haven [Conn.], 1997, 299 – 305.

11   Goldstein Parnass, 283.

12   Mosse, German Jews, 42.

13   Amos Funkenstein, 'The Political Theory of Jewish Emancipation from Mendelssohn to Herzl', in: Walter Grab (ed.), Deutsche Aufklarung und Judenemanzipation: Internationales Symposium anlasslich der 250 Geburtstage Lessings und Mendelssohns, Tel Aviv, 1980, 21 – 22.

14   See: Michael Lowy, Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central Europe: A Study in Elective Affinity (tran. Hope Heaney), Stanford, 1992.

15   See for example Hermann Cohens differentiation between Nation and Nationalität in: Hermann Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism (tr. S. Kaplan), New-York, 1972, 362. (German ed. Frankfurt am Main, 1929, 421).

16   This discourse is stimulated mostly by the work of Homi K. Bhabha. See his: The Location of Culture, London, 1994.

17   Rachel Livneh-Freudenthal, in a short comment on her study of the Wissenschaft, used this term to describe the German-Jewish culture (Livneh-Freudenthal, 214). I haven't found other scholars who use the term in this way and my use here is much broader than the one of Livneh-Freudenthal. I use it as the key term to describe the problematic binding of the German and the Jewish cultures.

18   Goldstein Parnass, 284.

19   Hermann Cohen, 'An open Letter to Dr. Martin Buber', in: Selected Essays from 'Jüdische Schriften', (Hebrew translation), Jerusalem, 1977, 101.

20   A novel by Gottfried Keller. This novel was in its time one of the most influencial Bildungsroman's (formation novels).

21   Goldstein Parnass, 286.

22   Moritz Goldstein, 'Wir und Europa', Vom Judentum, Leipzig, 1913, 209.

23   Hollander was the leader of the C.V (Central Verein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glauben), until the holocaust.

24   CV Zeitung 16/12/32 p. 513. Also cited and translated to Hebrew at: Guy Miron, 'Between Assimilation and seclusion: Emansipation and Jewish Existance in Weimar Germany in the Eyes of the Liberal Jewish institution', Judaism of Our Time 11 (1998), 111 (Hebrew). My translation here is with minor corrections to Miron's.

25   Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, 1986. Hereafter cited as Smith.

26   These three studies were published at the same year, 1983: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London, 1983, 2nd ed. 1991, hereafter cited as

Anderson; Ernest Gellner, <u>Nations and Nationalism</u>, Ithaca NY, 1983; Eric Hobsbaum & Terence Ranger (ed.), <u>The Invention of Tradition</u>, Cambridge, 1983, 263. hereafter cited as Hobsbaum;

[27] Yehouda Shenhav, <u>The Arab-Jews: Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity</u>, Tel-Aviv, 2003, 127 (Hebrew), hereafter cited as Shenhav.

[28] Smith, 3.

[29] Strictly speaking, these are not real logic paradoxes, It seems more appropriate to call them tensions between the national idea and its praxis.

[30] Bishara is relying on a study by Walker Connor which uses another study from 1971. Bishara was wrong in the figures that he use: According to Connors study 9% of the surveyed states (12 out of 132) are indeed nation states, 19% of the states have more then 90% of their population belonging to one Nation, and in the rest of the states in the world (about 70%) the largest national group comprise of less then 90% of the population (Walker Connor <u>Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding</u>, Princeton, 1994, 96)

[31] Azmi Bishara, 'Between Nationality and Nation: Thoughts about Nationalism' <u>Theory and Criticism</u> 6 (1995), 41.

[32] Will Kymlicka, <u>Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights</u>, Oxford, 1995, 1. Hereafter cited as Kymlicka.

[33] Kymlicka, 11.

[34] Azmi Bishara, 'Suddenly a man wakes up in the morning, He feels he is a nation and begins to walk' epilogue for the Hebrew addition of: Benedict R. Anderson, <u>Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,</u> Tel-Aviv, 1999, 246.

[35] Acording to Gelner and Hobsbaum.

[36] Acording to Anderson.

[37] Anderson, 195.

[38] Anderson, 201.

[39] Hobsbaum, 263.

[40] Quoted in Hobsbaum, 267.

[41] See: Elie Kedourie, <u>Nationalism,</u> Oxford, 1996.

[42] Gelner and Hobsbaum.

[43] Anderson.

[44] As I stated above, for although most states present themselves as nation-states, very few states are in practice nation states.

[45] Connor notes that the very definition 'a nation-state' is hyphenated and this is a sign for the fundamental differences between a nation and a state (Connor, 96).

[46] Yossi Dahan and Henry Wasserman, <u>To invent a Nation</u>, Raanana, 2006, 17 (Hebrew).

[47] Shenhav doesn't discuss the unusual phrase that he uses in the title of his book (apart from a short note on p. 21). He uses it as if it was natural although it is very rear in Israeli discourse.

[48] Shenhav, 151.

[49] Shenhav, 21, note.

[50] It seems to me that Heines famous quote that 'Wherever they burn books they will also, in the end, burn human beings', can be distressingly paraphrased according to this fact.

[51] Gloria Anzaldu'a, <u>Borderlans/La Frontera: The new Mestiza</u>, San Francisco, 1987, 79.

[52] George L. Mosse, <u>Confronting the Nation: Jewish and Western Nationalism</u>, Hanover, 1993, 149. Hereafter cited as Mosse Confronting.

[53] Mosse Confronting 178.